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Introduction 1
One of the starkest realities faced by UN actors engaged in the multi-faceted business
of conflict management - be it in the humanitarian, development, or political
dimensions of war - is the fact that several of the worst humanitarian crises of the past
decade have come in the wake of the collapse of UN-sponsored or facilitated peace
agreements.2 The worst fighting in Angola followed the collapse of the Lusaka
Protocols; agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN over East Timor did
not forestall violence and crisis resulting from the elections; and most dramatically,
the Rwandan genocide occurred during UN efforts to implement the Arusha Accords.3
These few catastrophic episodes highlight a wider problem, namely consolidating
peace and maintaining stabil it y in the wake of conflct and crisis. As a large number
of civil wars have ended in the i 990s, so the international community has
increasingly been occupied with this challenge. In its ambitious version, this is
referred to as "rebuilding post-conflict socIeties". More minimally, the challenge is
to ensure political stability and lay the ground for economic and social recovery.
Within the UN, post-crisis assistance has historically been managed jointly (some
would say dis-jointly) by humanitarian and development actors. This joint effort has
been framed in policy terms as a challenge of the transition between relief and
development. This problematique of relief-to-development partially shapes UN
policy in a diverse set of countries, from Kosovo to Congo-Brazzavile. Furthermore,
the problematique covers a wide range of specific operational challenges, ranging
from socIal reintegration of returning refugees to demobilisation of ex-combatants.
As a result, the relief-development issue has generated a myriad of distinct but
overlapping policy processes. These processes have often been captured by
institutional competition and politics. Because the problematique is insufficiently
articulated, and because there are enormous institutional stakes vested in their
outcomes, these policy processes have obfuscated as much as they have clarified.
l This paper was written while the author was avisiting scholar at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, as a
contribution to the CMI project "Between emergency and development". Until May 2000, Bruce Jones
was responsible for policy issues related to strategic co-ordination and post-conflict peacebuilding in
the UN's Offce fòr the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, New York. He was also a member of
the UN's Advanee Mission in Kosovo, and was involved in the design of the UN's transitional
authority in East Timor. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone. They are not
necessarily those of the United Nations.
2 Stephen Stedman, Don Rothschild and Elizabeth Cousens, "Introduction." in Stephen Stedman, Don
Rothschild and Elizabeth Cousens, eds., Peace Implementation: Themes, Issues, Challenges
(Forthcoming, 2001). The phenomenon is of course not limited to the UN; for example, the worst
violence in Kosovo followed the collapse of the NA TO-brokered Rambouilet Accords.
3 On the collapse of the Lusaka protocols, see Virginia Page Forta and Stephen Stedman,
"Implementing Lusaka", draft paper for Stedman et al, Peace Implementation; on East Timor, see
Report olthe Seeretary-General on the UN Assistance Mission to East Timor, (New York: UN, 1999);
on Rwanda, see Bruce D. Jones, "Civil War, the Peace Proeess, and Genocide in Rwanda" in Robert O.
Matthews and Taisier Ali (eds.) Civil Wars in Afriea: Roots and Resolution (Montreal & Kingston:
McGil-Queens University Press, 1999), pp. 52-87.
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Nevertheless, a certain trend can be discerned in the UN's responses to post-crisis
situations. With growing recognition of the political causes of the recurrent relapse
of seemingly post-crises cases back into acute crisis, there has been a conceptual shift
towards a policy framework which places greater emphasis on political stabilisation
in post-conflict settings, a framework partially captured by the UN-term
"peacebuilding". This shift towards peacebuilding as a policy framework has
significant political and institutional ramifications. Most significantly, the result has
been an extension ofthe UN's political involvement in post-crisis settings.
This paper reviews certain aspects of the post-crisis problem, as seen from within the
UN.4 It outlines the wide variation in cases and elements that fall within post-crisis
policy, noting some efforts at c1assification of that variation and sugge sting a basis
for more detailed categorisation. Then it explores the shift in UN responses to post-
crisis, emphasising the growing involvement of the Security Council and UN
political departments in the direct management of post-conflict assistance. Finally, it
outlines a number of challenges faced by the UN in attempting. to developa more
effective approach to the post-crisis situations.
Nature and Aspects of the Problem
There are literally dozens - possibly hundreds - of offcIal UN documents, lessons-
learned studies, policy statements and reports relating to what is variously known as
the relief-development continuum, transitional assistance, relief-development
linkages, post-conflict reconstruction, or, most recently, the relief-development gap.
A quick perusal of any one of these documents will reveal two things: that they refer
to an astonishing range of specific operational problems; and that the problem is
considered in a range of cases across the globe with very diverse features. Arguably,
one part of the explanation for limited policy progress on post-crisis issues within the
UN, and elsewhere, has been the failure to unpack the problem into its constituent
parts or to pay sufficient attention to context.
Context
The variation in context of post-crisis situations is geographical, political, economic,
and organisational. Significant differences between cases inc1ude: the nature of the
conflict and the settlement; the degree of settlement; the degree of economic collapse
within the state; the economic vital it y of the region; the existence or not of a
powerful patron to the governent; whether or not the international community has
mounted a political or military respons e to the situation; and others. Some of these
differences are in the nature of the conflct and the settlement, others are in the nature
4 Until April 2000, I was responsible for post-conflict policy in the UN Offce for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs. Thus, much ofwhat is discussed in this paper as actions of "the UN" are actually
actions or policy decisions in which I was directly involved. This is true also of much of what are
described as weaknesses or mistakes by the UN. These were often mine, at least in part. One further
note: at points in the text, L am quite critical of the UN. Academic writers on the UN talk about the role
of the face less bureaucrat. L am very familiar with the faces involved. lndeed, in working at the UN, L
have seen what most outsiders coming into the UN find: that notwithstanding all of the problems, the
core of the UN is composed by a small num ber of intelligent, dedicated, and principled staff members.
Thankfully, one of the defining characteristics of this core staff of the UN is that they are relentlessly
self-critical. L have been privileged to work with them over the past two years, and hope that any
criticisms expressed or implied in this text wiI be taken in the constrctive, self-critical vein they are
intended.
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of the international response. They combine to create radically different post-conflict
settings. A few examples of the different situations considered to be part of the post-
crisis problematique illustrate something of the breadth of situations being addressed.
Compare the nature of the post-conflict situation in just two contexts: East Timor and
Guatemala. The former saw a short period of acute violence following a quarter
century of gestating, low-Ievel conflct between an occupying state and a rebel force;
the collapse of the state during the post-electoral violence; and the departure of the
Indonesian state machinery and many of its local supporters to West Timor or
Indonesia. Guatemala on the other hand experienced one of the longest running civil
wars of the post-World War n era, a war between a relatively capable state and a
small group of rebels (several thousand strong); no collapse of the state; a political
settlement between the two sides leading to full disarmament of the rebels; elections
and the revival, however uncertain, of constitutional politics.
Then consider the differences in the nature of the international response to two other
post-conflct settings: Kosovo and Congo-Brazzavile. In the former, the
international community has a military presence of over 35,000 troops; has pledged
over $2 bilion for reconstruction; is represented by over 300 international and non-
governental organisations; has almost total legal and juridical authority for a
transitional period; and is operating in a context where the various European powers
and the United States see direct security, political and economic interests. In the later,
in a region of Africa that has never been central to the interests of the major powers,
the international community has no UN political presence, no peacekeeping
presence, a handful of UN and non-governmental humanitarian agencies, and a
minimal UN development presence. The differences in international capacity to meet
the post-conflict challenge in these two cases, are vast.
Important differences exist even when one compares countries on the same continent
with similar levels of pre-war economic development, such as Rwanda and Liberia.
Both were characterised by medium length conflicts, by situations in which one party
to the conflct ended up with a virtual monopoly on power, by a high degree of ethnic
fracture and tension, and are now weak states in the early stages of recovery from full
collapse at the peak of conflict. Yet in Rwanda, the situation is one where the
government achieved power through military victory, where society has been rent by
a massive genocide, and where the ary is stm engaged in active regional conflict. In
Liberia, the governent achieved power through elections, albeit marred by heavy-
handed persuasion tactics, and is no longer actively engaged in military conflct
(though it supports the RUF in neighbouring Sierra Leone). Furher, Rwanda
continues to enjoy a fairly high degree of international attention, resulting in very
significant financial flows to Rwanda both through humanitarian channels and
bilateral assistance channeIs. Liberia on the other hand receives almost no money
through humanitarian channels and minimal bilateral assistance.
Confusingly, the label "relief-to-development" linkages is also applied to contexts
where localised, long-runing emergencies persist in relatively stable settings. In
such contexts as Sri Lanka and U ganda, a significant challenge for the aid
community is to sort out the relationship between humanitarian assistance and
development aid, especially in relationship to wider strategi es of conflict
management. Many of the specific features of post-crisis situations (described below)
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are prevalent in these protracted emergencies, but there are significant political and
institutional differences between these and more narrowly defined post-crisis
situations.
Some efforts have been made to develop conceptual categories around these different
sets of cases. In particular, Michael Doyle has written on the different "worlds" of
peacebuilding. Doyle sees the primary features of the differences between cases in
terms of the number of factions, their coherence, and the degree of reconciliation
between them.5 Using these features, Doyle constructs a matrix of cases which can
be plotted in terms of the degree of challenge of peacebuilding. Where you have
many, incoherent and umeconciled factions (Somalia, Sierra Leone), we should
expect that the political challenge of peacebuilding wil be considerably more
difficult than when there are few, coherent, and reconciled factions (El Salvador,
Mozambique). It is notable that many of the cases recorded in UN conventional
wisdom as "succes ses" occurred in cases that, by comparative standards, were
relatively straightforward in their post-crisis dynamics.
Doyle's is a very helpful contribution. However, it considers only the political
dimension of the situation. Seen in terms of the wider challenge of post-crisis
challenges, a wider set of factors is likely to be relevant to policy-making. For
example, we should expect that the economic challenge of peacebuilding wil be very
different in Congo-Brazzavile than in Kosovo; that the social challenge of
peacebuilding wil be greater in Rwanda than in East Timor; that the military
challenge wil be greater in Afghanistan than in Guatemala.
Furhermore, while Doyle's model is useful for indicating what degree of
international authority and presence is like ly to be required for successful
peacebuilding, experience shows that the level of the international presence is not a
function of need, but primarily of pre-existing political interests and connections.
Thus, building the level of international interest into the categories, rather than
treating it as a separate feature, is likely to be necessary in terms of policy making.
Policy must take into account both the nature of the challenge and the level of
available resources, not treat the later as a function of the former. Further work in
this direction would constitute auseful contribution both to the literature and to UN
policy making.
Recurrent Elements
Of course, the reason that the same conceptual framework is applied to a broad and
diverse set of cases is that many of the same problems recur in these cases,
irrespective of context. It is to these that we now turn. However, it is important to
keep in mind that however similar the recurrent problems appear, the differences in
geographical, political, economic and international context matter significantly for
the effectiveness of international responses.
Some of the recurrent challenges in post-conflct settings include:
Continued political and military instability. Rare is the post-crisis setting that do es
not see continued military skirmishes, inter-communal clashes, and significant
5 Michael Doyle, "Worlds ofPeacebuilding", draft paper for Stedman et aL., Peace Implementation.
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political instability. Within the context of peace settlements, parties often retain a
capacity for violence as a negotiating tool or to secure political and territorial gains.
Some of these resort to force when confronted with acting on commitments made
during negotiation - for example UNITA in Angola or the RUF in Sierra Leone.
Even when the parties cooperate at the politicallevel, this does not always translate
into compliance throughout the ranks. CIashes between groups of demobilising
soldiers are frequent occurrences, which threaten political stabilty even when they
do not signal a return to war. Even when one side of the conflict ends up in power,
through military victory or other means, opposing parties do not just disappear.
Rather, defeated opponents often find haven across a border, from where they
continue attacks on their home state - examples include the anti-independence
militias in West Timor, and the former Rwandan genocidaires in eastern Zaire. This
frequently sparks regional conflct into which is drawn the new, weak government,
amplifying the stabilisation challenge. In general terms, then, continued insecurity
and military instability is often a significant factor in 'post-crisis' situations.
Quasi-legitimate counterparts. Even in contexts of relative political stability, it is
often the case that the UN do es not recognise the governent as a fully legitimate
political partner. Sometimes this is due to the lack of an elected counterpart, such as
in Kosovo. Even where the existence of a peace agreement between parties means
that the UN can offcially work in support of a transitional governent, such
agreements are usually hampered by fracture, distrust and paralysis within power-
sharing governments. Such governents not only have legitimacy problems, but are
usually highly ineffective. Thus, post-crisis political counterparts are rarely both
legitimate and effective, and are often neither. For UN political and development
actors, whose mandates and methodologies emphasise support to a national
government, this is a major challenge. (Traditionally, this has been se en as less of a
challenge for UN humanitarian actors, whose programmes are designed to work
directly in support of war-affected populations, and are therefore less concerned by
the nature of authority. A later section ofthis paper, however, wil present arguments
for rethinking this conception.)
Collapsed or drastically constrained states. Quite apart from weakness at the political
level, post-conflct societies are often ones in which the state has fully or almost fully
collapsed as a result of prolonged conflict. The better cases are ones where the
fighting never occurred within the bounds of the capital city, and where as aresult
some of the administrative machinery of the state was left intact. Even in such cases,
however, the state was often constrained to controllng a narrow circle of territory
outside the capital city; efforts to expand the state into the country side or regions
constitute a major state-building exercise (an example is Mozambique). The worse
cases are those in which the departing regime (and sometimes, less explicably, the
ariving regime), lays waste to the physical and economic infrastructure of the state
machinery (as occurred in Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor), meaning that the state
building process must proceed from a very low level, if not from scratch. In many
cases, also, the human resources of the state have been decimated by years of
conflict. The most challenging contexts are those such as Kosovo and East Timor
where virtually the entire staff of the state machinery flees the country in the face of
a military victory by forces opposing the regime.
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Economic collapse. In many wars, conflict and eventual state collapse is
accompanied by economic collapse. This can involve the collapse of the currency,
collapse of markets, loss of trade relations, withdrawal of international financial
systems, destruction of economic infrastructure, and wholesale loss of investment
and jobs. In some conflcts, the leve! of physical damage is much lower than in
others, which aids reconstruction, but many conflicts are marred by wholesale
destruction of property, often in the final stages of a war. The challenge of economic
reconstruction alone is a significant one for post-conflct actors.
Pockets of Assistance. It is usually the case that unlike in either 'normal development
situations' or acute crises, post-conflct situations usually demand the simultaneous
provision of humanitarian and development assistance. The ending of war does not
immediately result in the meeting of humanitarian need; needs continue often for a
period of one to two years, especially with returning refugees or resettling internally
displaced persons. This creates significant policy challenges for aid actors, who have
to reconcile the economic conditions for development with competing humanitarian
imperatives.
Nature of the UN Response
If the diversity of contexts, resources and elements of post-crisis situations
constitutes a significant degree of complexity, it is almost matched by the diversity of
UN actors engaged in post-crisis settings, the number of their roles, and the multiple
mechanisms by which their actions are, at least in theory, co-ordinated. It is
something of an artificial distinction, but these actors and roles can be explored in
terms of three inter-related elements: relief and development assistance; political
stabilisation efforts; and co-ordination.
Managing Relief-to-Development Linkages and Transitons
Over much of the past decade, the international aid community has had the primary
responsibility for managing international responses in post-conflct settings. As
active conflict receded, so, typically, did those charged with managing conf1ict
resolution processes, such as UN mediators or peacekeeping forces. The aid
community - humanitarian and development assistance agencies of the UN, their
counterparts in the non-governental organisation (NGO) community, and the major
bilateral donors - were then tasked with supporting the reconstruction of political and
economic li fe in so-called war-torn societies.6
The relief and development programmes in post-crisis settings are managed by an
alphabet soup of UN development and humanitarian actors. They collectively
constitute a small part of the wider set of multilateral, non-governental and bilateral
actors engaged in post-crisis aid.
(a) UN Aid Actors
The UN's humanitarian presence in post-crisis settings is essentially identical to its
presence during crises. It is led by the 'big three' - the UN High Commissioner for
6 This was the name given to a major UN research programme which has subsequently become a self-
standing initiative - the War- Tom Societies Project of the UN Research Institute for Social
Development.
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Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Children's
Fund (UNICEF). Additionally, a number of smaller humanitarian agencies, or
humanitarian programmes of development agencies, play roles in the provision of
assistance to war-affected populations. These include such agencies as the World
Health Organisation (WHO) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).
Additionally, the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
typically has a presence in early post-crisis situations, though is a less significant
player than during acute crises.
On the development side, the UN' s presence is led by the UN Development
Programme (UNDP) and the main UN development agencies, the WFP, UNICEF,
the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). Various UN specialised agencies - such as the
FAO, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the UN Education, Scientific
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) - play small but not insignificant roles in
providing advice and support to emergent governents. Additionally, development
policy departments of the UN have recently tried to expand their activities in the
post-conflict field. For example, the Department for Economic and SocIal Affairs
(DESA) has sought to provide technical advise on fiscal and economic elements of
post-conflict assistance. These efforts have as yet been highly constrained by the
centralised, headquarters-based nature of such departments.
The UNDP has played a particularly significant role in this arena, both as the usual
in-country co-ordinator of UN activities and as the UN' s lead development actors.
However, the UNDP's programme for what it refers to as 'countries in special
development circumstances' has long been caught between those who see post-
conflict settings simply as development challenges under difficult circumstances,
those who see them as humanitarian crises with a few additional opportunities, and
those who see them as special circumstances that fit neither category. Indeed, as one
UN offcIal has argued, UNDP has never even defined what development means in a
crisis or immediate post-crisis context. Even the question of who is responsible
within UNDP for post-crisis cases has been hotly disputed. On the one hand, the
Emergency Response Division was created ostensibly for precisely this challenge; on
the other, the various geographical departments claim and are often able to exercise
lead roles in shaping the UNDP response. This competition within UNDP both
reflects and contributes to a wider uncertainty within the aid community about how
to handle post-crisis development programmes.
This uncertainly also reflects the legislative framework within which UN
development actors work. This framework is composed primarily of the Economic
and SocIal Council ofthe UN General Assembly, as well as of the Executive Boards
of the various agencies. Typically, policy making in these bodies reflects a careful
consensus between OECD states (most ofthem aid donors) and G77 states (many of
them aid recipients). At times, the ne ed to cultivate a consensus with aid recipients
has frustrated donor efforts to generate a clearer role for UNDP within the post-crisis
arena. Unlike in the international financIal institutions, the G77 states carry a lot of
power in UN decIsion making, and among some of these states, greater UNDP
involvement in crisis and post-crisis settings is seen as tantamount to
interventionism, and is sharp ly resisted.
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(b) Aid Ro/es
Chronologically, the first task of the UN in post-crisis settings is the continued
provision of humanitarian assistance and protection. This involves many of the same
tasks as occur in an acute crisis: provision of food aid to those displaced by the crisis;
protection of the legal rights of civilians; provision of emergency medical services;
and others. A major sphere of humanitarian activity in post-crisis, one where the UN
has a prominent role through the UNHCR, is the return and reintegration of refugees.
In collaboration with such actors as UNICEF and the ICRC, UNHCR is also playing
an increasingly important role vis-à-vis the reintegration of internally displaced
persons (indeed, the distinction is the source of increasing controversy).
Many programmes which begin in the humanitarian sphere - such as provision of
medical care, basic education, etc - are ones which rightly belong as part of a
government or community-led package of socIal services. In collaboration with
NGOs, nascent governments, and bilateral actors, the UN plays a significant role in
post-crisis situations in what might be called socIal reconstruction. The humanitarian
dimension of socIal recovery is the first part of the UN' s work to fade out or to
diminish to a minor scaIe. Core social recovery programmes, including reconciliation
efforts, continue either through development channels or through a residual
humanitarian presence. However, the speed with which such a shift in UN presence
occurs depends very greatly on the degree of political and military stabil it y . In fluid,
uncertain situations, a major humanitarian presence is prolonged, sometimes for a
number ofyears.
In more stable situations, there is a fairly rapid shift in the UN's work towards
economic reconstruction. The economic challenges in post-conflct typically involve:
establishment of macro-economic stability; establishing a framework for fiscal
policy; restoration of markets; support to community-based development;
reconstruction of war-damaged infrastructure; restarting agricultural and industrial
activity; and reconstruction of state infrastructure. Within the UN, most efforts in this
sphere are directed to supporting the nascent governent, or local authorities. Less
emphasis is given to support to the private sector or to setting the conditions for
international investment. This reflects a deep commitment within the UN to the
concept of socIal as well as economic development. It also reflects the inter-
governental natur e of the UN and the prominence among many member states,
especially from the G77 but also from Europe, of a philosophy which sees the state
playing a significant role in development. This contrast with the more liberal,
private-sector oriented philosophy ofthe international financial institutions.
TheUN's role in economic reconstruction is sharply limited in relation to the roles
played by other multilateral actors and bilateral actors. The major factor in this
regard has been the beginning of a transformation of the World Bank into a
development actor with a significant presence in post-conflict settings. In particular,
the World Bank has often sought and in many recent cases been given the lead role in
donor co-ordination in post-conflict settings, formerly one of the UN's most
important roles. Bilateral actors also play a significant role in this regard through
their aid programmes. Additionally, the European Community is an increasingly
important player in this field. The sums of money that are channelled through such
actors dwarf those of the UN in most settings - though in some African contexts in
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particular, the sums available to the UNDP represent a significant portion of
international assistance.
Another major focus of activity in recent years has been a set of activities that fall
under the heading of governance. This includes human rights work, strengthening of
electoral systems, development of rule of law institutions including the judiciary,
security sector reform, and others. Some ofthis is old wine in new bottles; the UNDP
has been involved in governance work through its national development programmes
for many years. But some elements, especially in the security sector, are quite new.
Additionally, under pressure to find areas of comparative advantage, the UNDP has
experimented with community-based development programmes us ing NGOs as
partners, as distinct from its normal role in support of governent-led economic and
socIal development. In particular spheres, such as education, UN development actors
like UNICEF and UNESCO continue to play an important advisory and capacity-
building role.
(c) Policy
The challenge of managing humanitarian programmes in tandem with both socIal and
economic development is at the core of the relief-development problematique. The
manifold challenges involved are well documented elsewhere. These range from the
highly technical (different systems for raising and disbursing funds, different
recruitment and staff deployment arrangements ) to management issues (different
planning frameworks, varying timeframes for engagement) to the political (variable
degrees of support for emergent regimes) and the conceptual (distinct conceptions of
the nature of the post-conflict challenge, different principles on which aid is based,
etc.)
Within the UN, efforts to improve policy co-ordination on post-conflict aid, at least
at headquarters level, have focused on strengthening UN co-ordination mechanisms,
lobbying donors for greater fluidity in their financing regimes, and on early linkage
between planning frameworks for humanitarian and development assistance - the
UN Consolidated Appeals Programme and the UN Development Assistance
Framework, respectively. In the institutional politics which consumes much
ostensible policy-making, the prevalent focus has been on the "gap" between relief
programming and development action: the charge, specifically, that UN development
actors are too slow to start their programmes, leaving relief agencies holding the bag
and forced to take on roles (such as housing reconstruction) that they are il suited,
and under-financed, to play.? This concern has been emphasised by UNHCR among
others. There has also been a great deal of attention paid by the UN to the problems
created by the fact that some major donors have very rigid administrative distinctions
between relief and development budgets. This makes it difficult (a) to finance
transitional programmes in late-crisis situations, or (b) to finance early development
programmes in longer-term transitional situations. Indeed, in this, the UN often has
common cause with the managers of aid programmes in donor countries, many of
7 These issues were discussed extensively in the so-called Brookings Proeess, a series of meetings
hosted initially by the Brookings Institution and jointly sponsored by the UNHCR and the World Bank.
These is su es also inform discussion in the IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict.
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whom also seek more flexible aid budgets, over the opposition of treasury or finance
departments.8
Less explicit attention has been paid to the different conceptual bases for the two
types of assistance. Yet these are significant. Whereas humanitarian assistance is
focused on the needs of individuals and seeks to solve short to medium term
problems, development aid is more focused on longer-term problems of a national or
at least communal nature. Development actors place a far greater emphasis on the
state and on governent than do humanitarians - a repeated bone of contention
between the two communities. In the context of joint learning and policy making
efforts across the humanitarian - development chasm, the critical work on forging a
conceptual framework which provides guidelines as to what aid is supposed to do has
largely been sidelined by an excessive focus on technical and management aspects of
the problem.
For example, in Kosovo, after the end of the NATO bombing campaign, the
institution responsible for economic reconstruction (the European Commission) came
into conflict with UNHCR over strategies for rebuilding housing infrastructure. The
humanitarian approach was to provide large quantities of reconstruction supplies
directly to refugees in need; the reconstruction approach was to stimulate markets
and demand through targeted subsidies and thereby generate economic activity while
allowing people to rebuild themselves. The merits of each approach can be debated,
but the dash between concepts was significant.
The Kosovo example is also interesting for another feature, which suggests an
altogether different conceptual framework for thinking about the problem of
transitional aid. Specifically, as humanitarian actors in Kosovo, led by UNHCR,
began to think about the need to draw down their programmes and hand over to
others, they created co-ordination mechanisms to ensure a smooth transition. This co-
ordination mechanism linked the humanitarians not with development actors, but
with functional departments of the state. In Kosovo, under UN transitional authority,
the UN itself manages the state bureaucracy; this odd fact no doubt facilitated the
creation of co-ordination mechanisms in this case. But the significant point is that
what emerged spontaneously from Kosovo was a form of 'relief-to-state' transition
modeL. Given that the purpose of humanitarian assistance is to meet the basic,
essential needs of people when the state cannot or is unwiling to do so, it surely
makes sense to think of the phase out of humanitarian operations coming when the
state - not development actors - can take over their programmes. Of course,
development action is fundamentally about building the capacity of both state and
society, so a connection remains. But rather than thinking about transitions between
two different sets of international actors, what Kosovo suggests is the need to think
more about the differing but ideally complementary ways in which both
humanitarian and development actors can help states fulfil their obligations to their
citizens.
Kosovo is not the only instance of this kind of thinking within the humanitarian and
development communities. In the major humanitarian agencies, and in the academic
8 The most comprehensive account to date is Shepard Forman and Patrick Stewart (eds.) Good
Intentions: Pledges ol Aidlor Post-Confliet Reeovery. (Lynne Reinner, 2000).
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sector, some efforts have been devoted to increasing the capacity-building dimension
ofhumanitarian assistance. Such efforts are as yet very limited however.
Not unrelated to this approach, is the concept of peacebuilding and the need for
political stabilisation - of the state, primarily - as a pre-condition for effective
transitions. By the late 1990s, this conceptual framework of 'post-conflict
peacebuilding' was increasingly seen in the UN as an overall strategic framework
within which relief-development issues had to be tackled.
Political Stabilsation
The repeated experience of watching states ostensibly past their acute crises fallng
back into major conflct has been a significant learning experience for the UN. It has
resulted in far greater emphasis on the fundamentally political character of post-
conflct challenges. This in turn has led to an extension of UN political activity in
post-crisis settings. Though not yet fully institutionalised within the UN, this is an
evolution with significant implications.
Traditionally, the UN's only direct political involvement in post-conflict settings had
been when given a peacekeeping role (under the responsibility of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations.) In the 1990s, where the UN has had peacekeeping
operations, they have performed a range of roles related to overseeing and
guaranteeing the implementation of political settlements. This includes verification
of cease- fires; demobilisation and disarmament of former combatants; mine removal;
and provision of physical protection to government and international authorities.
Less commonly, it also includes military security versus external forces or and
military assistance to the governent (Sierra Leone). Finally, in recent contexts, the
mandates of UN peacekeepers has included the physical protection of all civilians
coming under direct threat from combatants (Sierra Leone, D.R.Congo).
After the back-to-back debacles of Somalia and Rwanda, the UN's peacekeeping role
declined considerably. In the past few years, the UN has had a minimal peacekeeping
role Moreover, even where there have been peacekeeping operations, they have
often been of limited duration, ending soon after the implementation of a political
settlement. Only at the tail end of the decade was there something of a resurgence in
UN peacekeeping, both in Africa and elsewhere. By mid-2000, the largest UN
peacekeeping presence was in Sierra Leone, and a small force was also being
planned to oversee a quasi-settlement in the D.R.Congo.
Increasingly, however, even where the UN does not have a peacekeeping role, or
where those roles have had a short duration, the UN has extended its political
involvement in other forms. This often occurs under the lead of the Department of
Political Affairs (DP A), either through a UN political mission, or through a new
innovation, UN Peacebuilding Support Offices (PBSO). The roles of these offices
include co-ordination of confidence-building measures and political stabilisation
efforts; electoral support, in terms both of pre-electoral education and registration as
well as direct assistance to local, national elections, and verification of the results;
efforts to strengthen and legitimate a new government, especially when that
governent is established through political settlement; hosting of donor conferences
to provide financial support to the new governent, and others.
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The use of Peacebuilding Support Offices has been a notable innovation. First used
in Liberia to help consolidate the peace agreements, PBSOs have since been created
in Guinea-Bissau (where the UN had no peacekeeping role) and in the Central
African Republic, following a brief peacekeeping mission which oversaw elections.
PBSOs are the institutional expression of the formal lead role for post-conflict
peacebuilding given to the Deparment ofPolitical Affairs in the Secretary-General's
1997 UN reforms.
The activities of these political offces extend into the sphere of rule of law and
human rights. They undertake tasks in post-conflict settings related to the
development of national human rights institutions, support to judicial reform, and
constitutional development. Such activities now constitute a far greater share of the
UN' s activity than more traditional human rights functions such as monitoring and
reporting, though these activities continue.
Of course, activities similar to those performed by PBSOs have been undertaken in
other contexts by the UNDP, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and
other UN actors. However, the adoption of these tasks by UN political offices is
more significant than a simple alteration of lead responsibility within the UN family.
Far more important is the fact that these offices operate under the legislative
authority of the Security Council, and therefore bring the Council directly into these
post-crisis efforts. The Security Council monitors the day-to-day developments of
these operations, and shapes operational policy decisions.
The involvement of the Security Council in peacebuilding lends considerable weight
to the UN's efforts in this regard. From the perspective of the host country, the
statements or decisions of a PBSO carr with them something of the weight of the
governents who comprise the Council, including obviously the US governent as
well as several major European powers. This political weight can be used to place
considerable pressure on local authorities, as well as on regional actors whose actions
may have a significant bearing on political stabilisation in a post-crisis setting. Of
course, the weight of the Security Council has not forestalled the collapse of peace
agreements in some past examples, notably Angola and Rwanda.
Furthermore, the involvement of the Security Council in peacebuilding activities has
a series of other implications as welL. The fact of development-oriented activities
being managed by the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly-based fora
which traditionally set policy in the economic sphere, raises questions about the
relationship between the primary organs of the UN. Significantly, the G77 has a
much less significant role in the Security Council than in the GA, though the
presence of China in the Council is an omnipresent check on the western members.
Furthermore, the reliance of political offces on mandates from the Security Council
also raises concerns about continuity at the end of the mandate. In past instances, the
abrupt withdrawal of peacekeeping missions with significant development portfolios
- such as UNT AC in Cambodia - meant the sudden end to many ongoing
peacebuilding and development-oriented programmes, with negative effect.
Increased political management of aid could exacerbate this problem.
On balance, however, the longer-term consequences of political management of aid
are probably more than offset by more effective efforts to stabilise political
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settlements in post-crisis contexts. While it may be the case that in the long run social
and economic development wil reinforce peace and reduce the potential for renewed
conflet, it is certainly the case that unstable politics undermines any form of
development, and a return to large-scale violence even more so. In the short term,
prioritising political stabilisation over development - where they are in conflct -
seems an appropriate strategy for the UN. In the medium to long term, political
stabilisation and development are mutually reinforcing.
It is worth noting one additional point about the shift towards a greater political role
for the UN in post-conflict. This is that it reflects ahesitant but nevertheless
significant revival of support for the UN's role in crisis and post-crisis contexts, in
particular among the European donor countries. This can be explained by a
coincidence of factors: the perceived success to date of the UN reform package
introduced in 1997; a 'loss of innocence' in the civil society sector, and a growing
recognition that many NGOs are beset by the same problems that initially led donors
to shift support away from the UN; and most significantly, as noted above, a growing
recognition of the fundamentally political challenge of post-conflict stabilisation. In
the last element in particular, the UN has a significant comparative advantage over
the civil society sector and even the international financial institutions. This is a point
to which we will return.
Co-ordination
The increasing frequency of the deployment of UN political field missions in post-
conflct cases has led to some confusion in the question of overall co-ordination of
UN activity in these contexts. Whereas previously the UNDP had an undisputed co-
ordination mandate for aid, and DPKO had the undisputed lead in UN field missions,
both of these questions are now in dispute. Indeed, the question of who within the
UN co-ordinates overall post-conflict activity is among the most contentious of
current UN policy debates. Given that the UN in theory co-ordinates not only its own
activity but that of some portion of the non-governmental and other multilateral
actors, the co-ordination role and challenges of the UN have significant impact on the
wider question of post-conflict assistance.
In many of its are as of responsibility, one of the UN' sprimary functions is to co-
ordinate the operations of a variety of external actors, especially civil society
organisations. The extent to which the UN is able to fulfi this role varies both by
sector and by case.
Furhermore, the UN is expected to play a co-ordination role not just within a given
sector such as humanitarian assistance, but between sectors. This again reflects a
comparative advantage of the UN - the only global organisation that has a political,
humanitarian and a development programme. The fact that the UN is engaged in a
host of activities across the various sectors of activities theoretically gives it an
advantage over other institutions and actors with a more limited range.
These two challenges - co-ordinating among a range of actors and co-ordinating
across sectors and - are central to the UN's post-crisis role
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(a) Co-ordination Mechanisms
The mechanisms through which the UN attempts to fulfil this role are in flux. For a
start, whereas within the narrow political or humanitarian fields there are clear
mechanisms for co-ordination within the UN, this is not the case in the post-conflict
arena.
Within the political sphere, there are two co-ordination mechanism relevant to post-
crisis: the Executive Committee for Peace and Security (ECPS) which brings
together political, legal, development, humanitarian and human rights elements of the
UN, under the lead of DP A; and the self-explanatory Co-ordinating Action on Small
Arms (CASA), led by the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA). The DPKO
is a significant presence in both. Even within this small trio of actors, there is
significant competition and lack of clarity vis-à-vis roles. In paricular, the past two
years have seen as growing tension between DP A and DPKO in particular on the
question of primary responsibility for post-conflct peacebuilding. As DP A has
expanded its field presence through the Peacebuilding Support Offices, this has
created a situation in which there are in effect two different kinds of frameworks
through which the UN co-ordinates political activity in post-conflct settings.
On the humanitarian side, there are also two co-ordination mechanisms, both led by
OCHA: the Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), which brings
together the UN humanitarian actors with co re development and political bodies; and
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which incorporates UN humanitarian and
development agencies, non-governmental organisations, and the ICRC. While ECHA
is the prime decision making forum for post-conflict issues, decisions are often first
aired with IASC members. In past times, many decisions relating to relief-
development linkages were handled within the IASC. More recently, with the advent
of a more political approach, ECPS has emerged as a major forum for tackling both
policy and operational questions. Even when the IASC is used for post-crisis issues,
DP A and DPKO are aske d to participate - as for example, in the IASC Reference
Group on Post-Conflict.
On the development side, co-ordination is done through the UN Development Group,
the membership of which comprises all of the UN development and specialised
agencies, as well as some development policy departments of the UN Secretariat.
This body is chaired by the Administrator of UNDP, who, as noted above, also
manages in-country co-ordination of the UN' soperational activities, through
Resident Co-ordinators.
A major difference between these three co-ordinating fora is the extent to which they
co-ordinate non-UN as well as UN entities. This is perhaps strongest on the
humanitarian side, where the IASC actually contains non-UN actors. Moreover,
under UN reform, OCHA has an explicit mandate to co-ordinate the activity of the
humanitarian community as a whole, and in recent years has had in some contexts
significant success in fulfilling that function. Its co-ordination authority and capacIty
varies from case to case, but in several recent instances OCHA has supported the
creation of in-country mechanisms, supported by a Humanitarian Co-ordinator, that
generate participation and support from a wide range of NGOs, bilateral actors, and
others. Of course, there are stil those who shy away from co-ordination by the UN.
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Most recalcitrant have been ECHO and some NGOs principally funded through
ECHO, such as Médécins sans Frontières (MSF).
On the political side, there are in most instances fewer actors involved in post-
conflict activities, and so a lesser co-ordination challenge. In the cases where many
different regional political institutions do get involved in political activities, the
extent to which they recognise the co-ordinating authority of the UN depends greatly
on the UN' s mandate, role, and the personalities. This was perhaps weakest in
Rwanda where, given the catastrophic role played by the UN during the pre-genocide
period, its post-conflict co-ordinating authority was minimaL. In more positive
examples, bilateral actors have worked through or in support of UN Special
Representatives or the equivalent, often through a "Friends" mechanism - ie. a
meeting of relevant states with the UN Special Representative or Secretary-General,
which is used to co-ordinate policy vis-à-vis local paries. The rising number of
NGOs involved in political issues poses a new challenge to political co-ordination
mechanisms at the one but one which so far has not weakened political co-ordination
at the headquarters level.9
The co-ordination of non-UN actors is weakest in the development realm. A number
of reasons can be posited for this. First, there is an enormous number of UN entities
involved in development, meaning that the internal co-ordination challenge is
greatest in this realm. Second, there has been a decline in the overall portion of
development assistance which is channelled through multilateral institutions,
meaning that the UNDP's spending is shrinking by comparison with bilateral
assistance. Third, partially as aresult, there has been astriking erosion of the
perceived authority and capacity of the ostensible co-ordinating agent, the UNDP.
And fourth, the World Bank has played a growing role in co-ordination in post-
conflct settings, bolstered by its considerable resources and by the support of a
number of influential states. The combination of a loss of fuds and pre stige with
significant competition has eroded the co-ordination capacity of UNDP - indeed,
support for the institution as a whole. Indeed, at the time of writing, the new
Administrator of UNDP had acknowledged that UNDP was in deep crisis and was
working furiously to find new niches and new roles for UNDP. Among the most
contentious and difficult was the precisely the question of post-crisis co-ordination.
What is notable is that among all of these co-ordination bodies, there is none that
brings together the main players in post-crisis. While ECPS and ECHA perhaps
comes closest, in having UN political, humanitarian, human rights and development
representation, both these bodies are missing the NGO community and the World
Bank. The NGOs and the Bank are part of the IASC; but that body has no UN
political representation. None of these fora connect in any formal way to the donor
community. And none have any direct involvement of affected governents or
regional organisations. .Informal networks such as the Conflct Prevention and
Reconstruction Network .do bring together all of these relevant bodies, but only in a
dialogue setting, not in a policy-making or operational co-ordination forum. For
9 For an account of UN efforts to relate to the new generation of conflict resolution NGOs, see
Fabienne Hara, "Burundi: A Case of ParalleI Diplomacy" in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson,
and Pamela AaIl (eds.) Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, (Washington, DC:
US Institute ofPeace Press, 1999).
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many working on post-crisis issues, this lack of a central, authoritative co-ordinating
forum for post-crisis is seen as a problem contributing to the weakness of the
multilateral system's efforts in this area.
(b) Cross-Sector Co-ordination
Were the co-ordination challenges in each of these spheres not great enough, the real
challenge has recently been that of forging linkages between these co-ordinating
bodies. One of the central tenets of 'peacebuilding' relates to the important of
linkages between political, humanitarian and development stabilisation efforts in
post-conflict settings. This has given rise to an increased emphasis on co-ordination
across these respective spheres of UN activity. The question has then arisen: who co-
ordinates the co-ordinators?
Unsurprisingly, given the institutional stakes involved, several of the different UN
entities involved in post-crisis activity have put forward their own framework for
overall UN co-ordination. Within the development sphere, under the lead of the UN
Development Group Office, the UN has experimented with the so-called UN
Development Assistance Framework. As its name suggests, this is primarily a tool
for enhancing the coherence of the programmes of the various UN development and
specialised agencies. It is based around a common assessment template, specified
programme cycles, and joint policy formulation (based on UN standards). However,
in the past few years there have been growing efforts to use the UNDAF as a policy
co-ordination tool even in "countries in special development circumstances" - i.e.
countries in crisis. The UNDAF has, for example, been used in Burundi to
orchestrate the UN' s development plans, notwithstanding the continuing conflct and
crisis in that country. However, the UNDAF is very limited as an overall co-
ordination tool for crisis, especially since it is managed by the UNDG - which, alone
of the three co-ordinating fora mentioned above, has representation from UN actors
in only one sector. No humanitarian or political entities of the UN are part of the
UNDG or have been part of the development of UNDAF, and unsurprisingly,
therefore, see little value in it as a co-ordinating tool.
More significantly on the development side, there has been a consistent defence of
the role of the UN Resident Co-ordinator (supported by UNDP and the UN
Development Group Offce) as the overall co-ordinator of post-crisis operations.
However, in 1997 the Secretary-General established the principle that when a UN
Special Representative was deployed to a country, that individual was tohave overall
co-ordinating authority over the UN. UNDP's adjustment to this new policy has been
slow and partiaL. In some cases, Resident Co-ordinators have been assigned as
Deputy SRSGs, bringing the two co-ordination mechanisms together. In more
general terms, however, there has been considerable resistance to this trend within
UNDP. This for two reasons: first, because of the concerns with political
management of aid, as outlined above; and second, for more narrow reasons of
institutional prestige. The UNDP's mandate for co-ordination is closely guarded.
(Ironically, as part of its own reform process, OCHA and the IASC have placed
greater emphasis in recent years on the fusion between humanitarian and
development co-ordination mechanisms - specifically, on appointing the UN
Resident Co-ordinators as Humanitarian Co-ordinators in a number of settings. This
has been mooted over time. The evolution of co-ordination arrangements within the
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UN, and the uncertain role of UNDP in this regard, may call for a re-evaluation of
this policy.)
This is especially so since the question of the relationship between humanitarian and
development co-ordination mechanisms is increasingly overtaken by the question of
each of there relation to political co-ordination mechanisms. More and more policy
support is being given by the UN leadership to the notion of integrated co-ordination
mechanisms, under the lead of a SRSG.
Two versions of this concept, quite distinct, have been put forward by political
departments. One, sponsored primarily by the DPKO, entaIls "integrated missions".
Used first in Kosovo and East Timor, but also planned for use in the D.R. Congo, the
integrated mission concept involves all elements of the UN' s presence forming part
of the UN's "peace operation" - to use the most recent terminology. In this model,
all of the UN' s programming, be it in development, humanitarian assistance, human
rights, or political spheres, falls under the direct authority of the UN Special
Representative. In addition, various other international and regional organisations
have formed part of the integrated missions in Kosovo and East Timor, including the
European Union and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. io
This approach emphasises a chain of command model, no doubt reflecting a certain
military culture in DPKO. Early experience with this model in Kosovo and East
Timor appeared to be successful in terms of mitigating co-ordination problems
within the UN. However, there is stil resistance to the wider application of the
model, both from UNDP as described above, and from some parts of the
humanitarian community which are concerned about a loss of impartiality and
independence.
Reflecting the more consensus-based diplomati c culture of the DP A is a sec ond
framework, namely the Strategic Framework. The SF is often associated with
humanitarian actors, because in its first innovation, in Afghanistan, the lead ro le was
devolved from DP A to OCHA. More recently, the Strategic Framework was
promulgated as a General Guidance, and applied to Sierra Leone. In generic terms,
this is also a tool for overall co-ordination by SRSGs, who is guided to ensure that
political, aid, and human rights elements of UN programming "inform and are
informed by" one another. Additionally, the SRSG, along with the Resident Co-
ordinator, is instructed to develop co-ordination mechanisms bringing together the
UN agencies, local and international NGOs, bilateral donors, and national authorities.
Early experiences of the Strategic Framework suggests that it suffers from the
opposite problem of the integrated approach: excessive inclusiveness. With so many
actors involved, it has proved very difficult to make the leap from generic consensus
to concrete decisions. Moreover, the mechanisms envisaged by the Strategic
Framework take a long time to establish - in both Afghanistan and Sierra Leone,
over a year elapsed between the launch of the framework and the appearance of
concrete results.
io See the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the UN Administration in Kosovo
(S/1999/779), and the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security on the UN Transitional Authority
in East Timor (S/2000/53).
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On the other hand, the Strategic Framework has one significant dimension missing in
the integrated mission concept: a formal commitment to working primarily through
and in support to national capacIties. In point of fact, this has not yet occurred in
either ofthe two test cases. However, the general concept is sound.
In any case, through such efforts such as the Strategi c Framework, integrated
missions, enhanced roles for Special Representatives, and others, the UN has sought
to provide a comprehensive policy framework for post-conflict recovery. However,
these co-ordination efforts have so far been characterised by an emphasis on process
over content, and an excessive focus on internal UN institutional competition. The
result has at been a proliferation of co-ordination mechanisms, which in some
instances has complicated overall co-ordination efforts. Consider, for example, Sierra
Leone. In this context, where there has been reasonable donor support for the UN to
play a lead role, with significant direct backing from the British governent, the UN
has deployed a multitude of co-ordinating mechanisms. There is an integrated
mission (led by DPKO), a Strategic Framework (led by DP A), and a Resident Co-
ordinator (under UNDP), plus at times a Humanitarian Co-ordinator (reporting to
OCHA). While these could all be pieces of an elaborate co-ordination puzzle, the
reality on the ground has been overlapping, unclear and excessively complicated co-
ordinating structures none ofwhich clearly relate to one another.
As this paper was being written, one proposal for improving co-ordination in Sierra
Leone being vetted within the UN was the possibility of having the Humanitarian
Co-ordinator serve as Deputy SRSG. In other words, the concept was mo ving more
in the direction of an integrated modeL. In this regard, it may be useful to consider the
relative merits of the two models vis-à-vis different stages of post-crisis. Don
Rothschild has noted a distinction between very early post-crisis efforts, which focus
on military stabilisation and humanitarian relief, and longer term efforts which are
more political and developmental in emphasis.1I It may yet prove that the integrated
mission model is a more effective political co-ordination approach for the early
phases of post-crisis, and that the Strategi c Framework model - or a less complex
variant - is more effective for longer term peacebuilding processes.
In any case, it is no doubt evident from this discussion of its co-ordination role, that
the challenges to the UN performing its multiple roles are considerable.
Challenges and ConstraInts
Indeed, the UN faces a number of constraints in implementing a more political
approach to post-crisis. Most of these have been touche d on, but they are worth
revisiting.
Nature of Political Authority
First, commensurate with a greater emphasis on the political aspects of post-conflct
assistance has been a growing recognition of the nature of post-conflct authority and
the challenges it poses. Even in contexts of relative political stability, it is often the
case that there is no governent that can offcially be recognised as the fully
11 Don Rothschild, "Conc1usion", Elizabeth Cousens, Stephen Stedman and Don Rothschild (eds.)
Peace Implementation: Cases. (Forthcoming, 2001).
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legitimate political partner of the UN. Even where the existence of a peace agreement
between parties means that the UN can officially work in support of a transitional
government, such agreements are usually hampered by fracture, distrust and paralysis
within power-sharing governents. Thus, counterparts at the politicallevel are rarely
both legitimate and effective, and are often neither. For UN political and
development actors, whose mandates and methodologies emphasise support to a
national governent, this is a major challenge.
The reasons for caution in relations with local authorities are good: too rapid
recognition of quasi-legitimate authorities can lead to excessive centralisation of
power and diminish the prospects for democratisation. However, as with the
prioritisation of political stabilisation over development, there is a strong argument
that this argument is tantamount to allowing the best to be the enemy of the good.
The costs of caution vis-à-vis quasi-legitimate authorities are high. In the case of East
Timor, the UN's early state-building efforts were complicated by hesitancy over the
recognition of the CNRT - a constellation of political parties that endorsed
independence, led by two Nobel Peace Prize winners and backed by Falantil, an
independence militia noted for its proper treatment of civilians during its military
campaign.
This kind of problem has been a recurrent feature of post-crisis situations. The issue
is hotly debated within the UN on a case-by-case basis. As yet, no offcIal policy has
been developed on the issue, no guidelines drawn up, no comparative lessons learned
studies commissioned. While the issue is clearly a very sensitive one, some work in
this direction could mitigate the difficulty of future post-crisis undertakings.
Also on this issue: with growing recognition of the problems posed by quasi-
legitimate authorities, it is increasingly understood within the UN that the problems
of financing transitions are not just of a technical nature. Rather, donors face the
same political dilemmas as the UN. For donor countries to engage in development
spending, as distinct from humanitarian spending, constitutes a very different kind of
decision, one that often involves recognition of the governental authorities in
question. In cases of quasi-legitimate authorities, this is obviously complicated.
Moreover, when a country has long been in crisis, this typically means an erosion of
the kinds of civil and politicallinks between that country and the donor that generate
political support for aid within the domestic political sphere of the donor capitaL. This
can be a significant impediment to a restoration of development aid in a context of
declining resources and a growing tendency to focus aid spending on a restricted set
of preferred recipients.
Lessons Learning and Policy Making in Complex Systems
Because UN agencies and departments all report, in some fashion or another, either
to a body comprised of all world governents or a representative set of them, post-
crisis policy is almost always set in a global, rather than context-specific context. The
effort by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to create a specific policy framework for
Africa - the Secretary-General 's Report on the Causes and Consequences of Conjict
in Africa - was among the first of its kind, and has frankly done little to alter the
nature of policy-setting or decision-making within the UN.
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This global policy setting is both a strength and a weakness. On the positive side, it
allows the UN to draw from successfullessons and experiences from a wide range of
contexts, and to see general patterns where actors closer to the local context wil tend
to see specific features. However, this positive aspects is largely outweighed by the
negative sides, which include: drawing lessons from past examples which contain
superficial similarities but which in fact differ substantially in both content and
context; the difficulty of drawing general policy lessons on such issues as relief-
development transitions when the resulting policy has to apply to such contexts as
different as Liberia and Kosovo; and the fact that general knowledge and patterns
tends to overwhelm specific knowledge.
Moreover, as is often the case with lessons learning, the tendency is to learn positive
lessons from past successful cases and negative lessons from past catastrophic
failures. There are two problems with this. First, there is little in the lessons learning
function within the UN (or for that matter in other multilateral organisations such as
the World Bank or the OECD) that allows policy-makers to draw lessons which are
specific to types of cases. The kind of categorisation of cases discussed above rarely
occurs. The typical pattern is that alessons learned study wil be commissioned
drawing on between four and six cases, chosen either for institutional reasons (one
case where WFP was important, one case where UNDP did well, one case where the
UN had a peacekeeping presence....) or because they represent varying points on a
spectrum (one early post conflict case, one case two years into a settlement, one case
five years into a settlement, etc). Geographical variation is also always a factor. The
nature of such analysis is that it can only generate rigorous lessons about the
institutional dimensions of the response - since these are more or less constant. The
UN rarely engages in a learning exercise where a suffcient range of cases is studied
to provide lessons applicable to types or categories of cases. The net result is that one
finds lessons from Afghanistan being applied to Sierra Leone; lessons from Bosnia
being applied to Kosovo; lessons from Cambodia being applied to East Timor. Very
little in the learning process intervenes to force policy makers to ask the question: are
the lessons applicable to this kind of case?
A second major constraint on effective policy making in a complex organisation like
the UN emerges from the range of actors involved, as described above. All of the
normal difficulties of proper institutionallearning and policy making apply to each of
the entities listed above. Added together, the problems of joint learning and policy
making are amplified. There are plus sides to joint policy making - the best
processes create opportunities for those involved in humanitarian or development
aspects of response to learn further from political actors about the challenges they
face or the nature of their response, and so to forge collectively greater
understanding. The down sides, however, are significant. The nature of the UN as an
institution is that there is a heavy premium on compromise and consensus.
The importance of this fact is that it means that when it comes time to set overall
policy for a post-conflct setting, it has proven extraordinary diffcult to get the UN
to recognise and tackle the challenge of making trade-offs or compromises between
competing priorities. There is a general presupposition (probably accurate) of the
long-term compatibility of the various goals pursued by the UN in post-conflict
settings. But when it comes to reconciling short-term trade-offs, it has been the
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general tendency to paper over the differences so that consensus can be reached. This
limits the articulation of effective policy.
Relationship with the World Bank
A third challenge is the question of the UN' s relationship to the World Bank. As
note d above, the World Bank has increasingly be en in competition with UNDP for
the lead role in co-ordinating the development dimensions of post-conflct assistance.
In some recent cases, including in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, there have been
significant political battles between the two multilateral organisations and their
respective backers in various capitaIs. New leadership at the UNDP and new policy
in the World Ban has led to a muting of these battles, but as yet there is no clear
division of labour between the two entities.
However, as this paper was being written, a significant policy shift was underway
within the World Bank and the UN, resulting in something of a rapprochement. On
the World Bank side, the shift appeared to result from the successful efforts of the
Social Development Division, including its Post-Conflict Unit, to focus the Bank's
attention on the social and political dimensions of growth in post-crisis settings, as
distinct from a focus exclusively on macro-economic policy. A growing recognition
within the Bank of a ne ed to engage on political questions, coupled with restrictions
on their capacity to do so in the absence of firmly recognised governing authorities,
has led the Bank to seek greater collaboration with the political departments and
programmes of the UN. Within the UN, at least within its political deparments, this
Bank effort has been warly received. This is both because the rift between the Bank
and theUN has long been recognised as a serious impediment to effective peace-
making, and second because the Bank's overtures have bolstered the UN's
confidence in its own role in conflict and post-conflct management, especially its
new, more political, framework for post-conflict assistance.
Conclusion: Institutional Innovation?
As this paper was being drafted, one of the major proposals being discussed within the
UN and among member states concerned with post-crisis issues, was an idea first
floated by the Center for International Cooperation at New York University. During a
process of dialogue and debate between UN entities, donors, NGOs, and recipient
governents, the Center suggested that some of the problems addressed in the paper
could be sol ved through the creation of what became known as a Strategi c Recovery
Facility (SRF).12
The basic notion of an SRF is to solve three of the most complicated problems
relating to post-crisis by bringing together a range of different actors under one roof.
As initially envisaged, the facility - or mechanism, or agency - would be co-chaired
by the UN and the World Bank, solving one problem immediately by bringing the UN
and the Bank into more active collaboration. Also represented in the chairmanship or
membership of the SRF would be humanitarian and development agencIes of the UN,
NGOs and donors - solving a second problem, by creating a policy-making and
operational co-ordination forum for post-crisis containing all the relevant actors, or at
12 Shepard Forman, Stewart Patrick and Dirk Salomons, Recovering From Confliet: Strategy For An
International Response. Policy Paper, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, New
York, 2000.
21
least representatives of them. Third, the SRF would, optionally, manage a fund or a
facility in which various donors, both private and public, could concentrate funds
devoted to post-crisis activities, which would then be readily available to support joint
action by the multi-lateral community in support of immediate post-crisis action -
solving, or at least easing, the problem of inappropriate financial systems for paying
for post-crisis essentials. Additionally, the SRF would serve as a repository of
learning, a kind of clearing house for system-wide learning of the sort not yet in
existence (with one small exception, for demobilisation-related activities, housed in
UNDP).
Whether such a facility would be able to ameliorate the central challenge - the
question of recognition and support to quasi-legitimate and partially-effective local
authorities - is debatable. There is, however, a precedent which suggests positive
evidence, namely the War-Torn Societies Project (WSP). While WSP's experience in
performing its core function of helping to identify local priorities for post-crisis
assistance had received mixed reviews, the project has gained many supporters within
the UN because of its degree of flexibility in developing relations with local
authorities. As a quasi-UN entity, WSP has some of the advantages of a UN official
agency, and the flexibility of an NGO.
A case for similar institutional innovation could be made for the post-crisis sector.
Indeed, what is required at this stage is not so much a serious discussion of whether
institutional reform and innovation is needed, but on precisely how this innovation
should occur; exactly what form it should take; what management structures it should
have; and how it can best solve some of the problems mentioned above without
adding complexity or bureaucratic burden to an already burdened system.
There is little doubt that a central part of any such debate, dialogue or innovation must
be an effort to strengthen the new improvement in the UN' s relationship with the
Bank. This wil be among the most crucial in determining the UN' s ability to perform
an overall co-ordinating role in post-crisis, its ability to make effective linkages
between humanitarian assistance and state capacity-building, and its ability to ensure
coherence between the economic reconstruction efforts of the Bank and its own
efforts at political stabilisation. An effective relationship between the two is the
essential building block for a new, more effective political economy of peacebuilding.
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